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Introduction
The global energy landscape and operating environment of the electricity supply industry (ESI) are undergoing a slow but certain transformation. The electricity sector is waking up to new disruptions occurring at the grid edge (Arriaga et al., 2017 ).
Distributed energy, clean energy demand and technological progress are reshaping the traditional, centralized fossil fuel-based electricity systems, to accommodate variable renewables and other network-related loads (Sioshansi, 2017) . The number of consumers becoming 'prosumers' 1 , either through improvements in energy efficiency, or through distributed energy resources, is also on the rise. These changes will become more pronounced as energy storage advances into a viable grid-based resource.
Falling wholesale energy prices at a time of rising generation costs, stagnant energy demand growth and growing penetration of renewable energy and other distributed energy resources are part of the transformation . These transformations were not anticipated by policy-makers advocating market-based reforms in the early 1990s. The latter were largely motivated by the breakdown of the traditional economies of scale argument associated with vertical integration of the electricity supply industry, and the potential for competition to lower prices, encouraging innovation in generation and retail supply. "Competition where feasible, regulation where not" was the overriding principle of market-based reforms (Newbery, 2002) . Electricity sector restructuring, when coupled with effective regulation and competition, was expected to deliver significant consumer benefits when designed and implemented well (Joskow, 2003) .
Policy attention of late has also focused on the suitability of electricity market reform carried under the 'standard' or prescriptive approach -the end result of which is market liberalization -for the integration of intermittent renewables. There is a growing concern that traditional energy-only electricity markets where price and investment signals are based on system marginal cost cannot function efficiently with both fossil fuels and renewables. The former have high marginal costs and the latter have zero marginal costs, potentially resulting in market disruptions and price volatility.
Consequently, policy has focused on finding new ways to integrate renewables and fossil fuels through adopting competitive solutions (such as the use of capacity markets in addition to energy-only markets) ).
A generic high-level reform of the ESI (the "standard approach" involves steps such as: corporatisation, vertical unbundling (separation) and restructuring of the sector, introducing competition in the wholesale generation, horizontal separation of incumbents to create competition, establishing an independent regulatory authority, and privatization of competitive segments of the ESI . The extent of vertical separation has varied across functional, accounting, legal, or ownership separation. Vertical separation was also expected to prevent cross-subsidization between competitive segments and regulated network businesses, and discriminatory behaviour such as denial of access to networks (Joskow, 1998) . However, policymakers and scholars have not adequately addressed the central question of "what are the implications of a small electricity system on the effectiveness of market-oriented reforms?" This paper argues that the effectiveness of reform and competition is limited by the size of an electricity system -in other words, there is a threshold size (and associated 4 characteristics) under which competition by itself will not produce the expected outcomes, and for which distinct policy solutions are required to resolve the problems of scaling up and integrating renewables. Small and isolated systems have characteristics which imply that the economic rationale underpinning the reform of large electricity systems is not readily applicable to them, as the benefits from increased competition are limited. Yet, this has not deterred policymakers from attempting the "standard approach" to reforms in small systems, recently including, for instance, Australia's Northern Territory electricity market (Nepal and Menezes, 2017) . Simultaneously, many countries (or territories) with small systems have ambitious renewable energy targets, and in principle face similar policy problems as "larger" or more conventional electricity systems, although the drivers behind these targets are related to electricity access for remote communities rather than decarbonisation per se.
The absence of prior literature on electricity reforms which accounts for the issues of small systems implies limited scope for learning from previous experience from such systems. Yet they account for a small but important number of countries in the Asia Pacific, South East Asia and the Caribbean. These countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and their reform objectives have included market restructuring alongside improving access and scaling up renewables (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a; Nepal and Menezes, 2017) .
This study attempts to fill the gap in literature by reviewing policy experience in three small electricity systems: two of these -Nicaragua and El Salvador -have successfully integrated renewables to over 50% of generation within a few years. Based on these countries' experience, we identify a number of practical policy solutions. We propose that a third, Australia's Northern Territory, closely fits the generic case for the adoption 5 of a similar approach, as the Territory has adopted an ambitious renewable energy target in the midst of ongoing power sector reforms. We conclude with policy options for countries or territories which face the problem of reforming electricity markets to integrate renewables, and which fit the characteristics of small electricity systems.
We suggest that electricity sector reforms and renewables can be complementary when supported by appropriate instruments and incentives in small systems. A sophisticated regulatory institutional framework is desirable, but is neither a necessary condition nor a guarantee for successful renewable energy development. Private sector investments can (but not necessarily always) correlate with a high share of renewables.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of small electricity systems and sets out the preliminary arguments on why these could adopt renewables integration alongside the 'standard' electricity reform model. Section 3 presents case studies on Nicaragua and El Salvador -two successful cases of electricity market reform and renewables integration in small systems -and Australia's Northern Territory. It documents existing policies and arrangements for renewable energy development in these markets. Section 4 synthesises policy lessons drawn from the case studies, applicable to other small electricity systems globally. Section 5 concludes.
The Characteristics of Small Electricity Systems
Several small systems have undertaken the process of restructuring their sectors to introduce greater competition riding on the 'wave' of popularity of electricity market reforms that were initiated and spread worldwide in the 1990s. Examples include countries in Africa, and small economies and territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific (Weisser, 2004) . In this section, we discuss the features of small electricity systems and 6 summarize the literature addressing the unsuitability of electricity reforms in the scaling and integration of renewables.
"Small" electricity systems can be defined by a set of distinct characteristics. In absolute terms, the literature defines a small electricity system as one that has an installed electricity capacity of below 1,000 Megawatts (MW) (Besant-Jones, 2006) . This is, however, not the sole characteristic. An electricity system can also be considered "smaller" relative to a wider electricity market. This could include a system situated within a country (such as the provincial markets in Australia), or within a wider region (such as individual systems within a transnational network -for instance the countries within Latin America's SIEPAC network) which accounts for a small proportion of that overall system. The Single Electricity Market (SEM) in Ireland is an example of a smaller and isolated market in the European context (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b ). An important trend including some small power systems globally is the formation of power trade areas with neighbouring countries and are summarised in USAID (2016).
In many small systems, energy demand is often too low (and the demand base is too small) to allow the benefits of greater competition to manifest -for instance, through the lowering of electricity prices. Small electricity systems are also sensitive to the impact of large foreign investors and developers in electricity generation and distribution (Besant-Jones, 2006) . The benefits of greater competition in small electricity systems may be lower than the transaction costs involved in fostering competition. Alternatively, the benefits of greater competition in small systems may be lower than the benefits obtained from economies of coordination and scope under vertical integration. The costs of vertical separation may be so large to offset the gains from competition even when it is possible to introduce limited competition in 7 generation and achieve some benefits (Bacon, 1994) . Hence, countries with small systems can have intermediate reform options although some degree of vertical separation is likely to improve quality of services and lower costs.
Many small systems are geographically distinctive, and prevalent largely among countries in the tropics with higher energy demand (Central America, the Asia-Pacific and the Caribbean). Given their often maritime locations and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and oil market volatility, many small systems have adopted ambitious renewable targets. Small systems in the tropics often host remote communities with relatively poor electricity access. Finally, small systems in the tropics generally have other reliable resources of renewables to draw on, such as continuous/more predictable solar, and often hydro, rather than solely relying on imported fossil fuels. As of 2014, there were around 88 small electricity systems in the world measured in terms of installed generation capacities (see Table 1A ). These small systems are predominantly located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. 2 An earlier study by Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) had estimated that around 100 countries have power systems smaller than 1000 MW.
Given the distinctive characteristics of small electricity systems, market-based reform may have lesser relevance to such systems (Bacon, 1994) . The "standard" or prescriptive model of electricity reforms -which is based on moving to liberalised markets with prices set according to system marginal cost -is debated in the literature as being unsuited to the integration and scaling up of renewables (Keay et al., 2013; Sen, 2014; Sen et al, 2016) . In order to summarise this debate, in energy-only markets that 8 were originally designed for fossil fuels, where prices are set based on system marginal costs, the incorporation of zero marginal cost renewables can potentially lead to price volatility, as prices would be zero (or very low) during periods when renewables are plentiful (i.e., the sun is shining or the wind is blowing). Conversely, they would need to be very high when renewables are unavailable, in order to incentivise investors to build the backup fossil-fuel generation required to stabilise the system. 3
Cross Country Case Studies
The problems faced by economies with small power systems in market reforms are similar to those faced by larger systems, although with varying intensity (Besant-Jones, 2006 ). However, small systems have a range of options available to them, without risking market disruption or hindering market design. These can support the development of renewable energy alongside restructuring the sector to operate more efficiently. The size of small electricity systems also limits the disruptive effects of a large-scale integration of renewables. This has been demonstrated for instance in small electricity systems in Central America. In this section, we provide an overview on the status of power sector reforms and renewable energy development in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Australia's Northern Territory using a cross-country case study approach.
We describe some specific characteristics to portray the underlying context in which power sector reforms have been implemented in these economies.
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The use of multi-country case studies is a popular technique to study the process and outcomes of electricity sector reforms in many developing and developed countries . Case studies can examine issues that do not easily lend themselves to rigorous quantitative analysis or that cannot be analysed due to the unavailability of disaggregated data. Further, the relatively sparse number of small systems in existence 4 limits our case selection to some extent, which is largely based on three parameters: (a) They fit the characteristics of small electricity systems as outlined in Section 2.
(b) They have common objectives in electricity reforms, namely -improving access and harnessing and scaling up their significant renewables potential.
(c) These are countries/territories that presently have (or are aiming to adopt) sophisticated competitive trading arrangements in their wholesale power markets, despite being small in size.
We focus on two countries with smaller systems in Latin America -a continent with substantial experience in electricity market reforms -which have also successfully scaled up renewables. Power sector reform has been widely adopted in Latin America since Chile's pioneering efforts in the 1980s in opening up the sector to private participation and competition (Pollitt, 2004; Millan, 2005) The electricity system in the Northern Territory, on the other hand, has transitioned from a state-run to a market-based system by undertaking the accounting separation of the previously vertically integrated system. The Territory is looking into competitive market designs of its wholesale and retail sectors. Approximately 99% of grid-supplied electricity in the NT is currently generated by natural gas, with 1% sourced from renewables. The Nicaraguan electricity sector was also unbundled into a single transmission company (ENATREL) also in charge of system dispatch; ENEL's generation assets were segregated for privatisation, while its distribution assets and functions were unbundled into two new companies and privatised (World Bank, 2012 ). Nicaragua's thermal (oilbased) and geothermal generation assets were privatised whereas its hydro assets were 13 not. 7 Notably, the government created a separate state entity -Comision Nacional de Energia (CNE) -in charge of planning, policy, rural electrification and legal initiatives.
The MEM (the Ministry of Energy and Mines) was created as a successor to CNE as a result of a 2007 legislation, with additional functions that were transferred from INE such as licensing and oil and hydrocarbon policies, as well as the approval of regulations and norms in the energy and mines sector (ESMAP, 2011).
In El Salvador, the development of the energy sector was in the hands of the state since the early 1940s. The energy sector underwent reforms that sought to redefine the role of the State in the sector in the 1990's (National Energy Council of El Salvador, 2016).
Reforms started by allowing SIGET (Superintendencia General de Electricidad y
Telecommunications) -which has been in operation since 1997 -to be in charge of regulating the industry. It was created as an autonomous body with its own budget and equity. A new regulatory framework created the environment for a more competitive power sector at the wholesale and retail levels. An energy exchange has also been in operation since April 1998. The Salvadorian market has a regulatory framework that enables all participants to freely operate in generation, transmission and distribution activities. The current El Salvador electricity market is comprised of the following structural framework (National Energy Council of El Salvador, 2016):
 A wholesale spot market (MRS) where the MRS price is production cost-based.
Hence, the price of energy depends on variable costs associated with fuel costs, and compensation for every MWh of power made available. Moreover, in early 2005, the remuneration of generators at the marginal cost of generation in the 7 Primarily as it did not attract much private sector interest; also, the hydro storage capacity was limited.
14 spot market was replaced by a 'pay-as-bid' scheme to account for higher spot prices due to increasing fuel prices (ESMAP, 2011) . *** Distributors in Nicaragua must have contracted, in advance, 80% of their forecasted demand (for power and energy) for the following year and 60% for the subsequent year. In El Salvador, distributors must contract 50% of their forecasted demand (for the first year), with a maximum of 25% for each independent contract. **** Public tenders are used by distribution companies in Latin American wholesale electricity markets to select the most favourable electricity supply contracts with generation companies. Such processes are regulated and supervised by the regulatory bodies of each country such as SIGET in El Salvador. The I-NTEM is in a transition stage towards a fuller NTEM (Nepal and Menezes, 2017 additionally not subject to income tax. Furthermore, ETESAL is required to guarantee priority dispatch, as in Nicaragua, to electricity generated from renewable sources. Table 2 enumerates the existing renewable energy policies and instruments in the energy sectors of Nicaragua and El Salvador.
Nicaragua El Salvador
National Policy
Grid Access  Preferential Dispatch  Other Grid Benefits such as planning or other fee exemptions The NT labour government has nevertheless adopted an ambitious renewable energy target of 50% by 2030 (Territory Labor, 2015) . Hence, there may exist opportunities to align the economic objectives of electricity reforms with climate objectives in the early stages of the NT's reforms. However, uncertainty exists regarding the alignment of electricity reform objectives with climate-related objectives in smaller systems such as the NT, given the ongoing "industry transformation". The ability of the electricity industry to resolve the energy policy "trilemma" of security of supply, affordability and sustainability is also being questioned and is attracting increasing support (see, e.g., Keay, 2016 and Pollitt, 2012 
Policy Lessons and Discussion
Several policy options are proposed below for other small electricity systems that are experiencing reforms in the advent of industry transformation. These policy options may also be particularly useful for smaller countries located in geographically complex settings such as the in the Asia-Pacific, South East Asia and the Caribbean where reforms are ongoing alongside policies to decarbonize their economies.
Increasing Private Participation in the Contestable Segments
Both Nicaragua and El Salvador have significant private sector participation in the Therefore, a standard first step to electricity market reform in small systems is to allow Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to sell electricity into the wholesale market. Entry can be encouraged in the short-term through favourable (negotiated) power purchase agreements (PPAs) between the IPPS and retailers to create 'competition in the market'.
The negotiated PPAs can reflect the differences in energy technologies (i.e. promoting renewables over non-renewables). In the longer run with more private participants, contracts could be auctioned or tendered as in Nicaragua and El Salvador to 'compete for the market'. For instance, the use of renewable energy auctions has led to significant growth in renewable energy capacity in other Central American countries participating in the regional market, including Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama (IRENA, 2016) .
Policy for attracting higher renewable energy investments also needs to focus on improving contract enforcement, thus minimising transaction costs and improving the credibility of the market for private investors. This can be done by streamlining the permitting processes to private investors and standardizing the rules for contracting with IPPs through PPAs.
Network Arrangements
Electricity from renewable sources is granted priority dispatch guarantee across both Nicaragua and El Salvador (i.e. electricity from eligible renewable energy producers is dispatched first). El Salvador also has guaranteed or regulated grid access for eligible renewable electricity producers while in Nicaragua eligible renewable energy producers are exempted from planning fees. Private participation through IPPs can be improved by changes in market rules, such as ensuring non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution systems (Woolf and Halpern, 2001) . Other small systems such as the NT could embrace these grid access policies. In addition, eligible renewable electricity producers can be exempted or discounted on transmission fees, while also prioritising electricity generated from renewables in case of grid congestion.
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The case studies have also highlighted the importance of an independent system operator (ISO) such as in the case of El Salvador. The ISO has a responsibility for controlling the access to and use of the transmission grid by competing generators and retailers, including commercial solar power producers. The ISO model has been globally advocated as wholesale power markets have been introduced and vertically integrated generation monopolies have been horizontally and vertically unbundled (Chawla and Pollitt, 2013) . However, both functions of the system controller and market operator are undertaken by the same entity in the NT, which contradicts the ISO model.
Regional Electricity Integration
Earlier studies on small electricity systems such as Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) 
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However, a major obstacle to the success of SIEPAC has been the lack of harmonization of regulatory practices and policies of individual member countries. 12 Electricity market integration and the development of renewable energy requires adequate network infrastructure, considering that renewable energy resources are distributed, and there is a need to extend existing grid networks to resource-rich and resource-poor zones. The lack of adequate network infrastructure and related investments is a barrier to renewable energy deployment. It increases the risks and costs associated with prospective renewable investments. For instance, the lack of interconnection between the NTEM and NEM can be considered a barrier in the development of large-scale renewable energy projects in the NT. However, the harmonization of regulatory frameworks at the start is necessary to facilitate energy integration across small electricity systems in the longer run, as the market expands.
Policies, Incentives and Support Mechanisms
Central 
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introduced net-metering. 13 El Salvador also has adopted a specific national policy through its "Solar Power Law/Programme" programme to support solar energy.
Both El Salvador and Nicaragua have recognized the importance of the investment climate and of stable financing in supporting renewable energy development. Policies are in place to hedge against currency volatility (usually denominating policy benefits in USD) to encourage foreign investments. Both countries have dedicated public funding, such as direct public investment to exclusively finance eligible renewable energy projects. Support is also provided for feasibility studies, resource mapping and other pre-investment activities. Similar policies could be adopted across other small electricity systems globally to meet renewable energy targets.
Opportunities for Accelerating Rural Electrification
Renewable energy provides opportunities for electrifying rural homes since the technologies make best use of the local available resources. For instance, in 2014, Nicaragua had one of the lowest electrification rates of around 67%, among all Latin American countries in 1990. However, by 2014, the national electrification rate had increased to 82% (World Bank, 2017 
Conclusions
This paper reviewed the experience of electricity reform in small systems alongside the development of renewable energy. We examined the experiences of Nicaragua and El
Salvador, and applied these to Australia's Northern Territory system, which is undergoing reforms and poised for an "industry transformation". Both El Salvador and Nicaragua liberalised their electricity markets, unbundled their vertically integrated utilities, and opened generation, transmission, and distribution to competition and private sector. Reforms in the Northern Territory are ongoing. Contrary to the debate over the suitability of the standard reform model in renewable energy integration, these countries are continuing to expand renewable energy despite the range of fossil fuel (often subsidised) options in the markets.
The case studies have underscored that electricity sector reforms and renewables can be complementary when supported by appropriate instruments and incentives in small electricity systems. The economic theory of market failures suggests that goods and service with positive externalities, such as renewable energy, are always underproduced when left to the market due to free-riding. However, market-based 32 interventions in the form of incentives and instruments can create a level playing field for both renewable and non-renewable technologies to compete and co-exist in small electricity systems as well, something which has been advocated by earlier studies on other world regions.
National policies with renewable energy targets and renewable-technology specific law; fiscal incentives through tax exemptions and support for the export and import of renewable energy/equipment; network arrangements such as non-discriminatory grid access and preferential grid dispatch; regulatory instruments such as capacity payments and net metering, and financing arrangements to attract private investments (both domestic and foreign) can help foster renewable energy development across small electricity systems. The role of private sector participation in generation and retail markets, interconnections, and the opportunity to align renewable energy development with expanding energy access in remote regions and communities are important in expanding renewable energy use in small systems.
Future research should focus on the capability of network infrastructure to support the high penetration of renewables and other network related loads, such as grid-based energy storage and plug-in vehicles, in the midst of ongoing industry transformation across small systems. The role of smart grids and smart network regulation in facilitating large-scale penetration of renewable into the grid is also a future area of research involving small electricity systems. 
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